Convicted:
2015, - Mission:
Ecuador - Quito
Alleged:
1,
Alleged crime scenes:
Perpetrator's home, Perpetrator's workplace, Victim's school,
Criminal case(s): Convicted, Found guilty, guilty, Jury trial, pleaded not guilty, - AKA George Lopez
updated Nov 18, 2026 - request update | add info
James Everett Kerne was a Mormon in Indepence, Oregon.
Kerne is a former instructional assistant at South Salem High School, Salem-Keizer School District (Oregon)
Kerne was CONVICTED OF:
10 counts of first-degree rape (ORS 163.375)
10 counts of coercion (ORS 163.275)
in Polk County, Oregon, in May 2015. Affirmed on appeal December 13, 2017.
SUMMARY
James Everett Kerne worked for the Salem-Keizer School District from 2004 to 2015. He was an instructional assistant at South Salem High School, where he met the victim when she was a 14-year-old student. She was an immigrant from Micronesia whose native language is Chuukese.
After she graduated, Kerne set up a scheme to make her believe she had to have sex with him. He told her that her name was on a “Mexican drug cartel list.” Posing as a man named “George Lopez,” he sent her texts and Facebook messages threatening to kill her and Kerne. Kerne then told her that “Lopez” was threatening him and taking his money, and that the only way to stop it was for the two of them to make sex videos. He said the cartel required two videos a month for two years. The Court of Appeals opinion describes the purpose as sparing the victim, her family and Kerne from harm or death.
The victim believed the threats were real and went along with the demands. She did not want to have sex with Kerne, and she would not have done so without the threats. From November 2013 to August 2014, she went to his home in Independence, Oregon, and he recorded videos with her, about two a month. According to the opinion, she had sex with him only when they were making the videos or when she believed they were. She stopped after a message from “Lopez” used a Chuukese word she had taught Kerne, which told her he was behind the “Lopez” messages. A family member later reported Kerne to police.
Charges and trial
The state charged one count of first-degree rape and one count of coercion for each month a video was made, 20 counts in all. Prosecutors argued that each time the victim had sex with Kerne because of the “Lopez” threats, it was coercion. They said the same conduct was also rape by forcible compulsion, through threats rather than physical force.
Kerne pleaded not guilty. His defense said the two were playing a consensual role-playing game and that the victim was not credible. He also said he did not know she believed the threats were real. The jury rejected that defense and unanimously convicted him on all 20 counts. He was sentenced to 16 years and eight months in prison.
Appeal
State v. Kerne, 289 Or App 345 (2017), Oregon Court of Appeals Case No. A159923. Judge Lagesen wrote the opinion, joined by Presiding Judge Ortega and Judge Egan.
Kerne argued that the trial court should have told jurors they had to find he knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion, as required by State v. Nelson (2011). His lawyers had not objected to the instructions at trial. The court agreed that leaving out the instruction was plain error, but it declined to correct it because the error was harmless.
The court’s reasoning turned on the coercion counts. Those instructions did require the jury to find that Kerne knowingly compelled the victim to have sex by making her afraid someone would be physically hurt. By convicting on those counts, the jury necessarily rejected his claim that he thought it was all a game. It found he knew he was forcing her through threats he made up. Under the case the state presented, he was either guilty of both crimes or of neither. The jury found him guilty, and the convictions were affirmed.
Custody
According to December 2017 news coverage, Kerne was held at Two Rivers Correctional Institution in Umatilla, with an earliest release date of December 2029.
In 2026, FLOODLIT received a report from a relative of Kernes, who asked not to be named. They reported that while Kernes was a teenager, he sexually abused another relative. “The church leaders knew about him abusing [a child]. [The victim] told them. I told them. They covered it up. ”
If you have any information about Kerne’s LDS membership history please contact us.
Have any info on this case? Contact FLOODLIT.
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Sources
- Man's conviction upheld for raping, threatening former student as fake cartel member,
- STATE OF OREGON v. JAMES EVERETT KERNE (2017) Court of Appeals of Oregon.,
- James Everett Kerne,
- State of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, V. James Everett Kerne, Defendent-Appellant.,
- Man's conviction upheld for raping, threatening former student as fake cartel member,
- 374 Or. 143 (2025) James Everett Kerne, v. Reyes. Supreme Court of Oregon.,
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1. Man's conviction upheld for raping, threatening former student as fake cartel member
The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld an Independence man's conviction for raping and threatening a former student with fictitious cartel violence.
A Polk County jury found James Everett Kerne, 41, guilty of 10 counts of first-degree rape and 10 counts of coercion in May 2015. He was sentenced to 16 years and eight months in prison.
Kerne and the victim first met while Kerne was working as an instructional assistant at South Salem High School and she was a 14-year-old student, according to Statesman Journal archives. Kerne worked for the Salem-Keizer School District from 2004 to 2015.
Using a fake name, he contacted her after she graduated and convinced the woman, an immigrant from Micronesia who spoke Chuukese as her first language, that her name was on a "Mexican drug cartel list."
Kerne told the woman she would have to pay a large amount of money to have her name removed from the list. He then said the cartel told him she could pay the gang back by having sex with him on video camera.
Kerne, pretending to be someone named "George Lopez," sent the victim text and Facebook messages. "Lopez" threatened to have gang members kill her, her family and Kerne if she did not make two sex videos a month.
More: Smoke alarms, son save Keizer family as fire destroys home
She told police she believed the threats were real and complied with the demands, despite not wanting to have sex with Kerne.
From November 2013 to August 2014, the woman traveled to Kerne's home in Independence and made the videos. When she received a message from "Lopez" using a Chuukese word she had taught Kerne, she realized they were the same person.
The victim stopped making the videos and cut off contact with Kerne.
She later disclosed the rapes to a family member, who notified police.
Kerne pleaded not guilty to all counts. During his trial, his defense attorney argued that he and the victim were engaged in a consensual role-playing game.
The jury unanimously convicted him of all 20 counts.
Kerne appealed his conviction. His attorneys contended that the trial court erred by not instructing jurors that they were required to find that Kerne knowingly subjected the woman to forcible compulsion.
In an opinion issued Wednesday, the appeals court stated that, although the trial court had erred, the error was harmless because it likely did not affect the jury's verdict.
By finding Kerne guilty on all counts, the jury gave more credit to the victim's version of events, the appeals court stated.
The jury's verdict demonstrated that they rejected Kerne's claim that the cartel ruse was "just a game" and he, therefore, knew he was forcing the victim to have sex with him.
The court declined to correct the "harmless" error and upheld Kerne's conviction.
Kerne remains incarcerated at Two Rivers Correctional Institution in Umatilla, where his earliest release date is December 2029.
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2. STATE OF OREGON v. JAMES EVERETT KERNE (2017) Court of Appeals of Oregon.
STATE OF OREGON v. JAMES EVERETT KERNE (2017)
Court of Appeals of Oregon.STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES EVERETT KERNE, Defendant-Appellant.
A159923
Decided: December 13, 2017
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Lagesen, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Erik Blumenthal, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.LAGESEN, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for 10 counts of first-degree rape, ORS 163.375, and 10 counts of coercion, ORS 163.275. He seeks reversal of the rape con-victions, contending that the trial court plainly erred when it did not instruct the jury that it was required to find that he knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion, as required under State v. Nelson, 241 Or App 681, 251 P3d 240 (2011), rev dismissed, 354 Or 62 (2012). Although defendant is correct that the trial court plainly erred, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct that error because it was harmless. See State v. Belen, 277 Or App 47, 54-57, 369 P3d 438 (2016) (declining to correct trial court's erroneous failure to instruct the jury regarding the mental state element of first-degree rape where error was harmless). We therefore affirm.
Defendant's crimes were against his former student, an immigrant whose native language is Chuukese (a language of Micronesia). He first met the victim when she was a 14-year-old high school student. After she had grad-uated from high school, defendant came up with a scheme that would leave the victim no choice but to have sex with him. He did so by convincing her that she had to make sex tapes with him to spare herself, her family, and defendant from harm or death from a cartel. Among other things, defendant, pretending to be someone named George Lopez, sent text messages and Facebook messages to the victim. In the messages, “Lopez” threatened to kill the victim and defendant. Defendant then told the victim that “Lopez” was threatening him, that “Lopez” was taking defendant's money, and that the only way to stop “Lopez” was for the victim to make sex videos with defendant. Specifically, defendant told the victim that they needed to make two videos per month for two years to satisfy “Lopez” and his cartel. The victim believed the threats to be real and complied with the demands. She did this despite not wanting to have sex with defendant and would not have done so absent the threats. As a result, defendant made videos with the victim from November 2013 to August 2014, making on average two videos per month. The victim had sex with defendant only when making the videos, or when she believed them to be making the videos. The victim stopped making the videos upon getting a message from “Lopez” containing a Chuukese word that she had taught to defendant. The use of Chuukese alerted her to the fact that defendant was pretending to be “Lopez.” A family member of the victim later reported defendant to police.
Based on that conduct, defendant was charged with one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree coercion for each month in which a video was made, for a total of 10 counts of first-degree rape and 10 counts of coercion. The state's theory, as laid out in its closing argument, was that defendant committed coercion each time the victim had sex with him because she did so based on the purported threats by “Lopez,” and that the same conduct also consti-tuted rape by forcible compulsion. The state argued to the jury:
“So, basically what you're going to hear is that there are 10 counts of RAPE IN THE FIRST DEGREE and 10 counts of COERCION. A count for rape and a count for coercion for every month from November through August of 2014. That is one time in each month between November and August of 2014 [that] the Defendant coerced and raped [the victim].
“Coercion, what does that mean. You're going to be instructed that you have [to find] beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly compelled [the victim] to engage in conduct which [the victim] had a right to legally abstain from, and that he compelled her or induced her—was the compelling or inducing was accomplished by instilling in fear in [the victim] that if she didn't engage in the conduct that she—that physical injury could come to herself or another person.
“Coercion doesn't require that the conduct be sex. It just happens to be in this case.
“[The victim] has a legal right to say no to sexual intercourse. And if she is induced to engage in sex by threats of fear, or threats that somebody is going—or a fear that somebody is going to be harmed if she doesn't that is coercion.
“But because it happens to be sex that we're talking about in this case it also happens to be rape. You're going to be instructed that in order to find the Defendant guilty of rape you must find that he knowingly had sexual intercourse with her. There is no dispute by anyone in this Court that that happened. And that [the victim] was subjected to forcible compulsion by the Defendant.
“And you're going to be further instructed that forcible compulsion is to compel by either physical force, which we do not have in this case, or a threat, expressed or implied that places a person in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or another person.”
(Capitalization in original.)
Defendant's defense was that he and the victim had been engaged in a consensual role-playing game and that the victim's claims to the contrary were not credible. Defendant asserted that, at a minimum, he did not knowingly compel the victim to have sex. According to defendant, he did not know that the victim thought the threats from “Lopez” and the “cartel” were real, and he thought that she understood that they were playing a game. He argued to the jury:
“When you go back into the jury room and you cannot put aside the idea that maybe she's trying to protect herself or her reputation with her family, but I would submit to you that that is reasonable doubt. If you go back into the jury room, and you think it's possible that [defendant], because of the wildness of the stories, and the things that [the victim] said to him did not understand that she didn't think this was a game. I would submit to you that that's reasonable doubt on whether he knowingly forcibly coerced her. Whether he knowingly compelled and induced her.”
The jury rejected defendant's theory and, when it credited the victim's version of events, unanimously found defendant guilty on all counts.
On appeal, defendant points out that the jury instructions on the elements of first-degree rape did not inform the jury that it had to find that defendant knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion, as required by our decision in Nelson, 241 Or App at 689. Defendant neither objected to the instructions that were given nor requested that the jury be instructed consistently with Nelson. He argues, however, that the omission of an instruction constitutes plain error under our case law. He argues further that we should exercise our discretion to correct that error because, in his view, there is some likelihood that the jury would not have convicted him of rape had it properly been instructed on the mental state element. Without such an instruction, defendant asserts that there is some likelihood that the jury convicted him of rape even if it credited his testimony that he thought the victim understood that they were playing a game.
In response, the state does not concede that the trial court plainly erred. However, the state acknowledges that we previously concluded that the omission of the instruction required under Nelson constitutes plain error. The state pri-marily argues that, even if the trial court plainly erred, we should not exercise our discretion to correct that error in this case, for a number of reasons, including that any error was harmless.
“To be ‘plain’ the error must (1) be an error of law; (2) be obvious, meaning that the legal point is not rea-sonably in dispute; and (3) appear on the record.” Dept. of Human Services v. H. F. E., 288 Or App 609, 611, ___ P3d ___ (2017) (citing ORAP 5.45(1); State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013)). As to the legal point here, we have routinely held that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it must find that a defendant knowingly subjected a victim to forcible compulsion as required by Nelson is plain error. State v. Waldbillig, 282 Or App 84, 92, 386 P3d 51 (2016), rev den, 361 Or 350 (2017); Belen, 277 Or App at 52-53; State v. Ross, 271 Or App 1, 349 P3d 620, rev den, 357 Or 743 (2015); State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 322 P3d 1094 (2014). In view of that precedent, the trial court's failure to deliver the required instruction here constitutes plain error.
The remaining question is whether to exercise our discretion to correct that plain error. Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991). One circumstance in which we will not and cannot exercise our discretion to correct a plain error is when that error is harmless, that is, when there is little likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. Waldbillig, 282 Or App at 93; Belen, 277 Or App at 57. If an error—whether preserved or unpreserved—is harmless, the Oregon Constitution requires that we affirm the judgment. Specifically, under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, “this court must affirm a judgment, despite any error committed at trial, if, after considering all the matters submit-ted, the court is of the opinion that the judgment ‘was such as should have been rendered in the case.’ ” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 28, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (quoting Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3).
Here, we are persuaded that the trial court's error was harmless. That is because the jury's verdict on the coercion counts demonstrates that the jury necessarily dis-credited defendant's assertion that he did not know that the victim did not understand it was all “just a game,” and affir-matively found to the contrary that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to engage in sex through the threats of harm that he was manufacturing.
The statutory definition of forcible compulsion is found in ORS 163.305(2):
“ ‘Forcible compulsion’ means to compel by:
“(a) Physical force; or
“(b) A threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or another person, or in fear that the person or another person will immediately or in the future be kidnapped.”
Although the jury instructions on the elements of first-degree rape did not tell the jury that it had to find that defendant knew that he was subjecting the victim to forcible compulsion, the trial court's instructions on the coercion counts did require the jury to find that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to have sex with him. With respect to each count of coercion, the jury was instructed:
“Oregon law provides that a person commits the crime of COERCION when the person compels or induces another person to engage in conduct to which the other has a legal right to abstain by means of instilling in the other person a fear that if the other person refrains from the conduct compelled or induced, or engages in conduct contrary to the compulsion or inducement the person or another will unlawfully cause a physical injury to some person.
“In this case to establish the crime of COERCION the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements.
“1. The act occurred on or between [the relevant dates].
“2. [Defendant] knowingly compelled or induced [the victim] to engage in conduct in which [the victim] had a legal right to abstain. And
“3. This compelling or inducing was accomplished by means of instilling in [the victim] a fear that if [the victim] refrained from the conduct compelled or induced [defendant] or another would unlawfully cause a physical injury to some person.”
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
Given those instructions and the state's theory of the case (that defendant was committing coercion by compelling the victim to have sex with him through his threats), the jury necessarily found that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to have sex with him through the threats of physical injury that he was making when it found defendant guilty on all counts of coercion. In other words, the jury did not believe defendant's testimony that he did not know that the victim did not understand that the threats from “Lopez” were not real. Consequently, had the jury also been instructed that it had to find that defendant knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion to convict him of rape for the same conduct, it undoubtedly would have reached the same conclusion. Similar to the circumstances in both Waldbillig and Belen, in which we concluded that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury in the manner required by Nelson was harmless, the record here does not supply an evidentiary basis that would permit the jury to find that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to engage in sex for purposes of the coercion counts, but conclude otherwise with respect to the rape counts. Under the theory of the case that went to the jury, defendant either knew that the victim believed that the threats he manufac-tured to induce her to have sex with him were real threats, in which case he committed both rape and coercion, or he did not know, in which case he committed neither offense. The jury found that he knew. Under those circumstances, the trial court's omission of the instruction required by Nelson was harmless.
Affirmed.
LAGESEN, J.
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3. James Everett Kerne
James Everett Kerne - Oregon
Date added: 8/21/2017
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James Everett KerneWho is James Everett Kerne? Was James Everett Kerne arrested? When was James Everett Kerne arrested? What was James Everett Kerne arrested for? Is this a mugshot of James Everett Kerne? Are there more Mugshots of James Everett Kerne? Is this the James Everett Kerne you know? Who decides which Mugshots are Indexed online? Who decides what public records the American public sees? Why should Mugshots remain public record and available to all citizens? Are Mugshot laws unconstitutional?
James Everett Kerne was booked in Unsorted, OR
Mugshots.com : 157459671
Name : Kerne, James Everett
Age : 40
DOB : 8/31/1976
Gender : Male
Race : White Or European Origin
Height : 6′ 0″ (1.83 m)
Weight : 210 lb (95 kg)
Hair : Blond
Eyes : Blue
SID : 13962402
Location : Two Rivers Correctional Institution
Status : Inmate
Earliest Release Date : 12/23/2029
Institution Admission Date : 6/25/2015
Names / Aliases:
#1 #2
Last Name KERNE
First JAMES
Middle EVERETT
Type CourtName
Charges:
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20
Docket Number 14CR32394/01
County POLK
Crime RAPE I
Sentence Type Inmate Sentence
Begin Date 06/25/2015
Termination Date -
4. State of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, V. James Everett Kerne, Defendent-Appellant.
Subsequent
References
CaseIQ
(AI Recommendations)LAGESEN, J.
Polk County Circuit Court
14CR32394; Monte S. Campbell, Judge. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Erik Blumenthal, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Lagesen, Judge. LAGESEN, J. Affirmed.LAGESEN, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for 10 counts of first-degree rape, ORS 163.375, and 10 counts of coercion, ORS 163.275. He seeks reversal of the rape convictions, contending that the trial court plainly erred when it did not instruct the jury that it was required to find that he knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion, as required under State v . Nelson, 241 Or App 681, 251 P3d 240 (2011), rev dismissed, 354 Or 62 (2012). Although defendant is correct that the trial court plainly erred, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct that error because it was harmless. See State v . Belen, 277 Or App 47, 54-57, 369 P3d 438 (2016) (declining to correct trial court's erroneous failure to instruct the jury regarding the mental state element of first-degree rape where error was harmless). We therefore affirm.
Defendant's crimes were against his former student, an immigrant whose native language is Chuukese (a language of Micronesia). He first met the victim when she was a 14-year-old high school student. After she had graduated from high school, defendant came up with a scheme that would leave the victim no choice but to have sex with him. He did so by convincing her that she had to make sex tapes with him to spare herself, her family, and defendant from harm or death from a cartel. Among other things, defendant, pretending to be someone named George Lopez, sent text messages and Facebook messages to the victim. In the messages, "Lopez" threatened to kill the victim and defendant. Defendant then told the victim that "Lopez" was threatening him, that "Lopez" was taking defendant's money, and that the only way to stop "Lopez" was for the victim to make sex videos with defendant. Specifically, defendant told the victim that they needed to make two videos per month for two years to satisfy "Lopez" and his cartel. The victim believed the threats to be real and complied with the demands. She did this despite not wanting to have sex with defendant and would not have done so absent the threats. As a result, defendant made videos with the victim from November 2013 to August 2014, making on average two videos per month. The victim had sex with defendant only when making the videos, or when she believed them to be making the videos. The victim stopped making the videos upon getting a message from "Lopez" containing a Chuukese word that she had taught to defendant. The use of Chuukese alerted her to the fact that defendant was pretending to be "Lopez." A family member of the victim later reported defendant to police.
Based on that conduct, defendant was charged with one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree coercion for each month in which a video was made, for a total of 10 counts of first-degree rape and 10 counts of coercion. The state's theory, as laid out in its closing argument, was that defendant committed coercion each time the victim had sex with him because she did so based on the purported threats by "Lopez," and that the same conduct also constituted rape by forcible compulsion. The state argued to the jury:
"So, basically what you're going to hear is that there are 10 counts of RAPE IN THE FIRST DEGREE and 10 counts of COERCION. A count for rape and a count for coercion for every month from November through August of 2014. That is one time in each month between November and August of 2014 [that] the Defendant coerced and raped [the victim].
"Coercion, what does that mean. You're going to be instructed that you have [to find] beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly compelled [the victim] to engage in conduct which [the victim] had a right to legally abstain from, and that he compelled her or induced her—was the compelling or inducing was accomplished by instilling in fear in [the victim] that if she didn't engage in the conduct that she—that physical injury could come to herself or another person.
"Coercion doesn't require that the conduct be sex. It just happens to be in this case.
" [The victim] has a legal right to say no to sexual intercourse. And if she is induced to engage in sex by threats of fear, or threats that somebody is going—or a fear that somebody is going to be harmed if she doesn't that is coercion.
"But because it happens to be sex that we're talking about in this case it also happens to be rape. You're going to be instructed that in order to find the Defendant guilty of rape you must find that he knowingly had sexual
intercourse with her. There is no dispute by anyone in this Court that that happened. And that [the victim] was subjected to forcible compulsion by the Defendant.
"And you're going to be further instructed that forcible compulsion is to compel by either physical force, which we do not have in this case, or a threat, expressed or implied that places a person in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or another person."(Capitalization in original.)
Defendant's defense was that he and the victim had been engaged in a consensual role-playing game and that the victim's claims to the contrary were not credible. Defendant asserted that, at a minimum, he did not knowingly compel the victim to have sex. According to defendant, he did not know that the victim thought the threats from "Lopez" and the "cartel" were real, and he thought that she understood that they were playing a game. He argued to the jury:
"When you go back into the jury room and you cannot put aside the idea that maybe she's trying to protect herself or her reputation with her family, but I would submit to you that that is reasonable doubt. If you go back into the jury room, and you think it's possible that [defendant], because of the wildness of the stories, and the things that [the victim] said to him did not understand that she didn't think this was a game. I would submit to you that that's reasonable doubt on whether he knowingly forcibly coerced her. Whether he knowingly compelled and induced her."
The jury rejected defendant's theory and, when it credited the victim's version of events, unanimously found defendant guilty on all counts.
On appeal, defendant points out that the jury instructions on the elements of first-degree rape did not inform the jury that it had to find that defendant knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion, as required by our decision in Nelson, 241 Or App at 689. Defendant neither objected to the instructions that were given nor requested that the jury be instructed consistently with Nelson. He argues, however, that the omission of an instruction constitutes plain error under our case law. He argues further that we should exercise our discretion to correct that error because, in his view, there is some likelihood that the jury would not have convicted him of rape had it properly been instructed on the mental state element. Without such an instruction, defendant asserts that there is some likelihood that the jury convicted him of rape even if it credited his testimony that he thought the victim understood that they were playing a game.
In response, the state does not concede that the trial court plainly erred. However, the state acknowledges that we previously concluded that the omission of the instruction required under Nelson constitutes plain error. The state primarily argues that, even if the trial court plainly erred, we should not exercise our discretion to correct that error in this case, for a number of reasons, including that any error was harmless.
"To be 'plain' the error must (1) be an error of law; (2) be obvious, meaning that the legal point is not reasonably in dispute; and (3) appear on the record." Dept . of Human Services v. H. F. E., 288 Or App 609, 611, ___ P3d ___ (2017) (citing ORAP 5.45(1); State v . Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013)). As to the legal point here, we have routinely held that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it must find that a defendant knowingly subjected a victim to forcible compulsion as required by Nelson is plain error. State v . Waldbillig, 282 Or App 84, 92, 386 P3d 51 (2016), rev den, 361 Or 350 (2017); Belen, 277 Or App at 52-53; State v . Ross, 271 Or App 1, 349 P3d 620, rev den, 357 Or 743 (2015); State v . Gray, 261 Or App 121, 322 P3d 1094 (2014). In view of that precedent, the trial court's failure to deliver the required instruction here constitutes plain error.
The remaining question is whether to exercise our discretion to correct that plain error. Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991). One circumstance in which we will not and cannot exercise our discretion to correct a plain error is when that error is harmless, that is, when there is little likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. Waldbillig, 282 Or App at 93; Belen, 277 Or App at 57. If an error—whether preserved or unpreserved—is harmless, the Oregon Constitution requires that we affirm the judgment. Specifically, under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, "this court must affirm a judgment, despite any error committed at trial, if, after considering all the matters submitted, the court is of the opinion that the judgment 'was such as should have been rendered in the case.'" State v . Davis, 336 Or 19, 28, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (quoting Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3).
Here, we are persuaded that the trial court's error was harmless. That is because the jury's verdict on the coercion counts demonstrates that the jury necessarily discredited defendant's assertion that he did not know that the victim did not understand it was all "just a game," and affirmatively found to the contrary that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to engage in sex through the threats of harm that he was manufacturing.
The statutory definition of forcible compulsion is found in ORS 163.305(2):
"'Forcible compulsion' means to compel by:
"(a) Physical force; or
"(b) A threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or another person, or in fear that the person or another person will immediately or in the future be kidnapped."Although the jury instructions on the elements of first-degree rape did not tell the jury that it had to find that defendant knew that he was subjecting the victim to forcible compulsion, the trial court's instructions on the coercion counts did require the jury to find that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to have sex with him. With respect to each count of coercion, the jury was instructed:
"Oregon law provides that a person commits the crime of COERCION when the person compels or induces another person to engage in conduct to which the other has a legal right to abstain by means of instilling in the other person a fear that if the other person refrains from the conduct compelled or induced, or engages in conduct contrary to the compulsion or inducement the person or another will unlawfully cause a physical injury to some person.
"In this case to establish the crime of COERCION the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements.
"1. The act occurred on or between [the relevant dates].
"2. [Defendant] knowingly compelled or induced [the victim] to engage in conduct in which [the victim] had a legal right to abstain. And
"3. This compelling or inducing was accomplished by means of instilling in [the victim] a fear that if [the victim] refrained from the conduct compelled or induced [defendant] or another would unlawfully cause a physical injury to some person."(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
Given those instructions and the state's theory of the case (that defendant was committing coercion by compelling the victim to have sex with him through his threats), the jury necessarily found that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to have sex with him through the threats of physical injury that he was making when it found defendant guilty on all counts of coercion. In other words, the jury did not believe defendant's testimony that he did not know that the victim did not understand that the threats from "Lopez" were not real. Consequently, had the jury also been instructed that it had to find that defendant knowingly subjected the victim to forcible compulsion to convict him of rape for the same conduct, it undoubtedly would have reached the same conclusion. Similar to the circumstances in both Waldbillig and Belen, in which we concluded that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury in the manner required by Nelson was harmless, the record here does not supply an evidentiary basis that would permit the jury to find that defendant knew that he was compelling the victim to engage in sex for purposes of the coercion counts, but conclude otherwise with respect to the rape counts. Under the theory of the case that went to the jury, defendant either knew that the victim believed that the threats he manufactured to induce her to have sex with him were real threats, in which case he committed both rape and coercion, or he did not know, in which case he committed neither offense. The jury found that he knew. Under those circumstances, the trial court's omission of the instruction required by Nelson was harmless.
Affirmed.
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5. Man's conviction upheld for raping, threatening former student as fake cartel member
The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld an Independence man's conviction for raping and threatening a former student with fictitious cartel violence.
A Polk County jury found James Everett Kerne, 41, guilty of 10 counts of first-degree rape and 10 counts of coercion in May 2015. He was sentenced to 16 years and eight months in prison.
Kerne and the victim first met while Kerne was working as an instructional assistant at South Salem High School and she was a 14-year-old student, according to Statesman Journal archives. Kerne worked for the Salem-Keizer School District from 2004 to 2015.
Using a fake name, he contacted her after she graduated and convinced the woman, an immigrant from Micronesia who spoke Chuukese as her first language, that her name was on a "Mexican drug cartel list."
Kerne told the woman she would have to pay a large amount of money to have her name removed from the list. He then said the cartel told him she could pay the gang back by having sex with him on video camera.
Kerne, pretending to be someone named "George Lopez," sent the victim text and Facebook messages. "Lopez" threatened to have gang members kill her, her family and Kerne if she did not make two sex videos a month.
She told police she believed the threats were real and complied with the demands, despite not wanting to have sex with Kerne.
From November 2013 to August 2014, the woman traveled to Kerne's home in Independence and made the videos. When she received a message from "Lopez" using a Chuukese word she had taught Kerne, she realized they were the same person.
The victim stopped making the videos and cut off contact with Kerne.
She later disclosed the rapes to a family member, who notified police.
Kerne pleaded not guilty to all counts. During his trial, his defense attorney argued that he and the victim were engaged in a consensual role-playing game.
The jury unanimously convicted him of all 20 counts.
Kerne appealed his conviction. His attorneys contended that the trial court erred by not instructing jurors that they were required to find that Kerne knowingly subjected the woman to forcible compulsion.
In an opinion issued Wednesday, the appeals court stated that, although the trial court had erred, the error was harmless because it likely did not affect the jury's verdict.
By finding Kerne guilty on all counts, the jury gave more credit to the victim's version of events, the appeals court stated.
The jury's verdict demonstrated that they rejected Kerne's claim that the cartel ruse was "just a game" and he, therefore, knew he was forcing the victim to have sex with him.
The court declined to correct the "harmless" error and upheld Kerne's conviction.
Kerne remains incarcerated at Two Rivers Correctional Institution in Umatilla, where his earliest release date is December 2029.
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6. 374 Or. 143 (2025) James Everett Kerne, v. Reyes. Supreme Court of Oregon.
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No. S071901.
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374 Or. 143 (2025)
James Everett Kerne, v. Reyes.
Supreme Court of Oregon.
July 31, 2025.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIEDPetition and supplemental pro se...
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