Armando Flores

Sources

1. 2015 UT App 88 | THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, Justia, April 16, 2015.
2. Former church leader charged with rape after allegedly assaulting teen in 2002, ABC4 Utah, March 4, 2025.
3. Former LDS branch president charged with alleged raped of teenager, FOX13 [Salt Lake City], March 4, 2025.

• 1. 2015 UT App 88 | THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

  • 16 Apr 2015
  • News article
  • Justia

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  2015 UT App 88

  _________________________________________________________

  THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

  STATE OF UTAH,
  Plaintiff and Appellee,
  v.
  ARMANDO FLORES,
  Defendant and Appellant.

  Amended Opinion1
  No. 20120438-CA
  Filed April 16, 2015

  Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
  The Honorable Robert P. Faust
  No. 101908899

  Joanna E. Landau, Attorney for Appellant

  Sean D. Reyes and Christopher D. Ballard, Attorney for Appellee

  JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which
  JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH and SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH
  concurred.2

  VOROS, Judge:

  ¶1 Armando Flores served for five years as a leader of a West
  Valley City church congregation. In 2012, he was convicted of

  1. This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion in Case No.
  20120438-CA issued on September 11, 2014.

  2. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special
  assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud.
  Admin. R. 11-201(6).
  State v. Flores

  sexual battery and unlawful detention for acts committed on a
  member of his congregation. Flores appeals his convictions,
  arguing that the trial court erred by prohibiting voir dire
  questions intended to uncover potential jurors’ religious biases.
  Flores also argues that the State used its peremptory challenges
  improperly during voir dire, violating his rights under the Equal
  Protection Clause. We affirm.

  BACKGROUND3

  Allegations of Sexual Abuse

  ¶2 Armando Flores served as the branch president of a small
  LDS Church congregation in West Valley City.4 In August 2009,
  Flores invited T.H., a sixteen-year-old member of his
  congregation who was also a family friend, to speak with him
  alone in his office. After their conversation, Flores grabbed her
  and ‚touched *her+ breasts.‛ At first T.H. did not tell anyone
  about the incident because she ‚didn’t think anyone would
  believe *her+.‛

  3. ‚On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most
  favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.
  We present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
  issues raised on appeal.‛ State v. Holgate,

  2000 UT 74

  , ¶ 2,

  10 P.3d
  346

  (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

  4. A branch president oversees a small congregation of members
  of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the LDS
  Church). The LDS Church describes a branch president as ‚the
  presiding priesthood leader‛ in a branch. See The Church of
  Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Branch Guidebook, at 4 (2001),
  available at https://www.lds.org/bc/content/shared/content/
  english/pdf/language-materials/31179_eng.pdf.

  20120438-CA 2

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  ¶3 In December 2009, after a New Year’s Eve party, Flores
  invited T.H. into a small, dark room at the church building
  where Flores’s congregation met. Flores followed T.H. into the
  room, closed the door, and again touched her breasts. In
  addition, Flores gripped T.H.’s left arm with his right hand, and
  when he heard someone in the hall, he covered her mouth with
  his hand until the person passed. When Flores took his hand off
  T.H.’s mouth, she ran out of the room.

  ¶4 The State charged Flores with one count of forcible sexual
  abuse based on the August 2009 incident and a second count of
  forcible sexual abuse and one count of kidnapping based on the
  December 2009 incident. All are second-degree felonies.5 At trial,
  the court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses
  of sexual battery, lewdness, and unlawful detention.6

  5. A person commits forcible sexual abuse if that person
  touches the breast of a female . . . with intent to
  cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any
  person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the
  sexual desire of any person, without the consent of
  the other.

  Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404

  (1) (LexisNexis 2008).
  A person commits kidnapping if that person
  intentionally or knowingly, without authority of
  law, and against the will of the victim . . . detains
  or restrains the victim for any substantial period of
  time . . . [or] detains or restrains a minor without
  the consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian
  or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if
  the minor is 14 years of age or older but younger
  than 18 years of age . . . .

  Id.

  § 76-5-301.

  6. A person commits sexual battery, a class A misdemeanor,
  if the person under circumstances not amounting
  to [a more serious sex crime], intentionally touches,
  (continued...)

  20120438-CA 3

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  Voir Dire

  ¶5 During jury voir dire, Flores requested that the trial court
  ask the prospective jurors about their religious affiliation. When
  the judge declined, defense counsel explained that jurors’
  religious affiliation may cause them to improperly weigh the
  testimony of certain witnesses:

  [T]he reason for that request is just due to the fact
  that a number of our witnesses are LDS, two of
  them are LDS clergy, the defendant himself was
  former LDS clergy. My request is based on finding
  out the affiliation of jurors so that we could gauge

  (…continued)
  whether or not through clothing, . . . the breast of a
  female, and the actor’s conduct is under
  circumstances the actor knows or should know will
  likely cause affront or alarm to the person touched.

  Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702

  (3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
  A person commits lewdness, a class B misdemeanor for
  most first-time offenders, when the person, under circumstances
  not amounting to a more serious sex crime,
  performs . . . under circumstances which the
  person should know will likely cause affront or
  alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is
  14 years of age or older . . . an act of sexual
  intercourse or sodomy . . . [or] any other act of
  lewdness.

  Id.

  § 76-9-702(1), (2).
  A person commits unlawful detention, a class B
  misdemeanor, if the person ‚intentionally or knowingly, without
  authority of law, and against the will of the victim, detains or
  restrains the victim‛ under circumstances not amounting to a
  more serious kidnapping crime. Id. § 76-5-304(1), (3) (LexisNexis
  2008).

  20120438-CA 4

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  whether they would be impacted by the testimony,
  have any prejudices or preconceived notions based
  on that fact.

  Though the trial court refused to ask prospective jurors about
  their religious affiliations, it did ask a question designed to test
  their ability to properly weigh testimony by religious leaders:

  [Y]ou need to judge the credibility of a clergy
  member or religious leader the same way that you
  would judge any other witness regardless of that
  person’s position in the community. The question
  is, do any of you feel that you would be unable to
  follow that direction . . . and not be able to sit as a
  fair and impartial juror in this case?

  No prospective jurors indicated that they would be unable to
  properly judge the credibility of a church leader serving as a
  witness.

  Peremptory Strikes

  ¶6 The State used all four of its peremptory strikes against
  male potential jurors. Flores challenged the State’s strikes under
  Batson v. Kentucky, arguing that the State’s use of peremptory
  strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause. See

  476 U.S. 79

  (1986). The trial court invited the prosecutor to ‚articulate on the
  record *her+ reasons‛ for each of her four strikes. The prosecutor
  explained that she struck the first potential juror because she
  feared his participation would create a basis for appeal, the
  second potential juror because of his age and lack of ‚life
  experience,‛ the third potential juror because of a ‚domestic
  violence history,‛ and the fourth potential juror because he
  seemed ‚offput‛ by the case.

  ¶7 Flores conceded that the State articulated a viable reason
  for excluding the first potential juror, but he argued that the
  State’s justifications for the other strikes did not constitute
  satisfactory nondiscriminatory explanations. However, the trial

  20120438-CA 5

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  court found that the State had ‚articulated *a+ legitimate basis for
  the reasons for *its+ strikes‛ and thus denied Flores’s Batson
  challenge. The jury consisted of five men and three women.

  ¶8 At trial, both parties called witnesses who were members
  of the LDS Church. T.H.’s parents, both LDS, testified for the
  prosecution. Flores’s witnesses included the stake president who
  oversaw Flores’s service as branch president, the branch
  president who replaced Flores, a young-women’s leader from
  his branch, and Flores himself.

  ¶9 The jury acquitted Flores of the charged felonies, each of
  which carried a prison term of one-to-fifteen years. Instead, the
  jury convicted him of two lesser included misdemeanors: one
  count of forcible sexual abuse and one count of unlawful
  detention, carrying jail terms of zero-to-one year and zero-to-six
  months, respectively.

  ISSUES ON APPEAL

  ¶10 Flores first contends that the trial court erred by
  preventing him from questioning the jurors at voir dire about
  their religious beliefs.

  ¶11 Second, Flores contends that the trial court erred in
  denying his Batson challenge.

  ¶12 Finally, Flores contends that, taken together, the voir dire
  restrictions and Batson determination constitute cumulative
  error, undermining confidence in the verdict.

  ANALYSIS

  I. Voir Dire

  ¶13 Flores contends that ‚the trial court abused its discretion
  in restricting voir dire on LDS religious affiliation and related

  20120438-CA 6

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  bias.‛ The jurors’ ‚religion was relevant,‛ Flores argues, because
  Flores was a former LDS branch president, the victim was a
  former member of his branch, seven of the ten trial witnesses
  testified to their LDS religious affiliation, and all of the alleged
  acts transpired in an LDS Church building. In response, the State
  argues that ‚religion was not particularly relevant in this case‛
  and that, ‚even if it were, it would not have created bias in favor
  of one side over the other.‛7

  ¶14 The Utah Constitution guarantees that no person
  ‚shall . . . be incompetent as a . . . juror on account of religious
  belief or the absence thereof.‛ Utah Const. art. I, § 4; see also Utah
  Code Ann. § 78B-1-103(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (‚A qualified citizen
  may not be excluded from jury service on account
  of . . . religion . . . .‛). But juror competence and juror bias are
  separate considerations. Therefore, while ‚it is ordinarily
  inappropriate to inquire into venire members’ religious beliefs
  during voir dire,‛ inquiries into religion may be appropriate
  when the case presents ‚the possibility of actual bias stemming
  from religious beliefs.‛ Depew v. Sullivan,

  2003 UT App 152

  , ¶ 13,

  71 P.3d 601

  ; see also, e.g., State v. Ball,

  685 P.2d 1055

  , 1060 (Utah
  1984) (holding that asking a potential juror whether ‚his
  abstention from the drinking of alcohol has a religious basis is
  not prohibited by the Utah constitution‛).

  ¶15 Voir dire examination serves two purposes: ‚the detection
  of actual bias . . . and the collection of data to permit informed
  exercise of the peremptory challenge.‛ State v. Piansiaksone,

  954
  P.2d 861

  , 867 (Utah 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks
  omitted). ‚*T+he obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in
  the first instance‛ with trial judges, who ‚must rely largely‛ on
  their ‚immediate perceptions.‛ Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451

  7. Flores also contends that if we reject this claim as unpreserved,
  his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve it. Because
  we address the claim on its merits, we need not address the
  alternative ineffectiveness claim.

  20120438-CA 7

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  U.S. 182, 189 (1981). Appellate courts therefore typically accord
  trial courts ‚ample discretion in determining how best to
  conduct‛ voir dire. Id.; see also Taylor v. State,

  2007 UT 12

  , ¶ 70,

  156 P.3d 739

  . ‚*T+rial judges are not compelled to permit every
  question that . . . might disclose some basis for counsel to favor
  or disfavor seating a particular juror.‛ Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at
  868. But ‚trial courts should be permissive in allowing voir dire
  questions and should exercise their discretion in favor of
  allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors.‛
  Id.

  ¶16 The nature of the voir dire questioning determines the
  scope of the trial court’s discretion. ‚That discretion is strictly
  limited where the questions are directly related to bias and
  prejudice, but increases as the directness of that relation
  decreases or, in some instances, where the question unduly
  intrudes upon the privacy of the jurors.‛ Id. Thus, questions that
  ‚directly search for questionable attitudes among jurors deserve
  more favorable treatment by trial courts.‛ Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d
  at 868. Moreover, a trial court’s ‚failure to ask questions in a
  particular manner‛ does not constitute error as long as the trial
  court’s substitute questions covered ‚the relevant subject area of
  potential bias.‛ Id. at 867.

  ¶17 Here, Flores urged the trial court to ask the jurors to state
  ‚their individual religious affiliation.‛ Defense counsel
  explained,

  ‚*A+ number of our witnesses are LDS, two of them
  are LDS clergy, [and] the defendant himself was
  former LDS clergy. My request is based on finding
  out the affiliation of jurors so that we could gauge
  whether they would be impacted by the testimony,
  have any prejudices or preconceived notions based
  on that fact.‛

  The trial court denied this request and instead asked the entire
  panel a question targeting impartiality: whether the panel
  members could ‚judge the credibility of a clergy member or

  20120438-CA 8

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  religious leader the same way that [they] would judge any other
  witness.‛

  ¶18 We conclude that the question requested by defense
  counsel was ‚not phrased in a manner calculated to uncover
  potential bias pertinent to the facts of this case.‛ State v. Burke,

  2011 UT App 168

  , ¶ 74,

  256 P.3d 1102

  . It was, rather, one that
  would ‚require multiple inferential steps or follow-up questions
  to elucidate real or possible bias.‛ Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868.
  While the proposed question ‚may have eventually led to
  indications‛ of religious bias, it ‚would have required several
  additional questions or inferences before reaching even an
  indication of latent bias.‛ Id.

  ¶19 We understand that the events of this case took place
  within a church context. Many of the trial witnesses were
  members or leaders of the LDS Church. Flores and the victim
  met because they were members of the same LDS branch. Both
  sides planned to call LDS Church members as witnesses—in fact,
  the defense called three LDS Church leaders (in addition to
  Flores himself) as witnesses. On these facts, the religious
  affiliation of a juror without more does not indicate bias. As the
  State argues, ‚*e+ven assuming that a juror who belonged to the
  LDS Church might favor her fellow members, knowing that the
  juror was LDS would not have indicated whether that juror
  would be more likely to favor the prosecution’s LDS witnesses
  or the defense’s.‛

  ¶20 Flores argues that ‚if a juror was agnostic or atheist,
  Flores might have followed up about bias against organized
  religion that might make the juror discredit the testimony of
  clergy or religious witnesses.‛ But this argument reveals that the
  requested voir dire question was one that would ‚require
  multiple inferential steps or follow-up questions to elucidate real
  or possible bias.‛ State v. Piansiaksone,

  954 P.2d 861

  , 868 (Utah
  1998).

  ¶21 As noted above, a trial court’s discretion ‚increases as the
  directness of [the relationship between the question and bias]

  20120438-CA 9

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  decreases or, in some instances, where the question unduly
  intrudes upon the privacy of the jurors.‛

  Id.

  Here, the proposed
  question was not directly related to bias and had some potential
  to intrude upon the privacy of the potential jurors. Moreover,
  while declining to ask each panel member’s religious affiliation,
  the trial court did ask a general question targeting their attitudes
  toward clergy. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
  exceed its discretion in refusing to ask the proposed question.

  II. Batson Challenge

  ¶22 Flores next contends that the trial court erred in denying
  his Batson challenge, because the State’s peremptory strikes were
  motivated by purposeful gender-based discrimination. In
  response, the State contends that Flores ‚has not shown that the
  prosecutor’s explanations for her strikes were gender-based.‛

  ¶23 ‚The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends
  beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
  touch the entire community.‛ Batson v. Kentucky,

  476 U.S. 79

  , 87
  (1986). Discriminatory selection procedures ‚undermine public
  confidence in the fairness of our system of justice‛ and act as ‚a
  stimulant‛ to prejudices that impede the ‚equal justice which the
  law aims to secure.‛

  Id.

  at 87–88 (citation and internal quotation
  marks omitted). Batson itself applied only to race-based
  discrimination in criminal trials. But in 1991 the United States
  Supreme Court extended its reach to civil proceedings, Edmonson
  v. Leesville Concrete Co.,

  500 U.S. 614

  , 631 (1991), and in 1994 the
  Court extended Batson to gender-based discrimination, J.E.B. v.
  Alabama ex rel. T.B.,

  511 U.S. 127

  , 128–29 (1994).

  ¶24 Batson aims to produce ‚actual answers to suspicions and
  inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury
  selection process.‛ Johnson v. California,

  545 U.S. 162

  , 172 (2005).
  In pursuit of those answers, a defendant may rely on the
  prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges against members
  of the protected groups to support a claim of purposeful
  discrimination. Batson,

  476 U.S. at 96

  . To test a defendant’s
  Batson claim, the trial court must oversee a three-stage process.

  20120438-CA 10

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  In the first stage, ‚a defendant must make a prima facie showing
  that a peremptory challenge has been exercised‛ on an
  impermissible basis, such as race or gender. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

  537 U.S. 322

  , 328 (2003). The ‚pattern of strikes‛ might be
  enough to make this prima facie showing, as might ‚a
  prosecutor’s comments and statements.‛ United States v. Johnson,
  No. 12-3229,

  2014 WL 2854996

  , at *3 (7th Cir. June 24, 2014).

  ¶25 In the second stage, the prosecution must offer a
  legitimate—in this case gender-neutral—basis for striking the
  juror in question. See Cockrell,

  537 U.S. at 328

  . ‚*T+he prosecutor
  must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his
  legitimate reasons for exercising *the+ challenges.‛ Batson,

  476
  U.S. at

  98 n.20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
  But while a ‚Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in
  thinking up any rational basis,‛ Miller-El v. Dretke,

  545 U.S. 231

  ,
  252 (2005), the prosecutor’s gender-neutral explanation need not
  be ‚persuasive, or even plausible,‛ Purkett v. Elem,

  514 U.S. 765

  ,
  768 (1995) (per curiam).

  ¶26 In the third stage, ‚the trial court must determine whether
  the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.‛ Cockrell,

  537 U.S. at

  328–29. To do so, the trial court assesses whether the
  contested strikes were ‚motivated in substantial part by
  discriminatory intent.‛ Snyder v. Louisiana,

  552 U.S. 472

  , 485
  (2008). ‚*I+mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and
  probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful
  discrimination.‛ Purkett,

  514 U.S. at 768

  . While the third stage
  requires the trial court to evaluate the credibility of the
  prosecutor’s justification, ‚the ultimate burden of persuasion
  regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never
  shifts from, the opponent of the strike.‛

  Id.

  ¶27 Though the justifications provided in Batson’s second
  stage inform the trial court’s determination in the third, the two
  stages must be kept distinct. The prosecutor’s ability to articulate
  a neutral basis for a peremptory challenge does not guarantee
  third-stage vindication. ‚When there is reason to believe that
  there is a racial motivation for [a] challenge, neither the trial

  20120438-CA 11

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  courts nor [the appellate courts] are bound to accept at face
  value a list of neutral reasons that are either unsupported in the
  record or refuted by it.‛ Johnson v. Vasquez,

  3 F.3d 1327

  , 1331 (9th
  Cir. 1993). Conversely, the prosecutor’s inability to articulate a
  logical basis for a peremptory challenge does not doom the
  prosecutor to a finding of purposeful discrimination. As the
  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, ‚*A prosecutor’s+
  reasons may not be logical, but that’s what peremptory
  challenges are all about. They are often founded on nothing
  more than a trial lawyer’s instinct about a prospective juror.‛
  United States v. Thompson,

  827 F.2d 1254

  , 1260 (9th Cir. 1987). So
  although ‚it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason *for
  exercising a peremptory challenge+ is,‛ once a defendant alleges
  purposeful discrimination, prosecutors must ‚simply . . . state
  [those] reasons as best [they] can and stand or fall on the
  plausibility of the reasons *given+.‛ Dretke, 545 U.S. at 252.

  ¶28 Proving purposeful discrimination under Batson presents
  a formidable enough task in the trial court. But once a trial court
  has stamped its approval on a prosecutor’s peremptory
  challenges, mounting a successful Batson challenge on appeal
  verges on the impossible.8 The reason lies in the standard of

  8. The United States Supreme Court ‚consistently and repeatedly
  has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in jury
  selection offends the Equal Protection Clause.‛ Miller-El v.
  Dretke,

  545 U.S. 231

  , 238 (2005). But the Court has also
  recognized ‚the practical difficulty of ferreting out
  discrimination in selections discretionary by nature.‛

  Id.

  Batson’s critics bemoan the toothlessness of the system the
  Court has devised to combat discrimination in jury selection.
  One observed that our ‚current framework makes it exceedingly
  difficult for judges to reject even the most spurious of
  peremptory strikes.‛ Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu,
  Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically
  Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney,

  96 Cornell L. Rev.
  1075

  , 1077 (2011). Another noted that Purkett v. Elem allows
  (continued...)

  20120438-CA 12

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  review: a trial court’s Batson determination rests on factual
  findings that ‚largely . . . turn on evaluation of credibility,‛ and
  we give those findings ‚great deference.‛ Batson,

  476 U.S. at

  98
  n.21. Accordingly, we will not set aside a trial court’s
  determination regarding discrimination during jury selection
  absent clear error. State v. Higginbotham,

  917 P.2d 545

  , 548 (Utah
  1996).

  ¶29 The prosecutor here used her four peremptory strikes to
  remove four men from the jury pool. For the purposes of this
  opinion, we refer to them as Jurors 1, 2, 3, and 4. Because the
  ‚exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms
  that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of
  the system,‛ we examine each strike individually. See J.E.B. v.
  Alabama ex rel. T.B.,

  511 U.S. 127

  , 142 n.13 (1994).

  A. Waiver of Challenge to Juror 1

  ¶30 Flores waived his Batson challenge to Juror 1 below.
  Before his Batson challenge, Flores had moved unsuccessfully to
  exclude Juror 1 for cause. The prosecutor struck Juror 1 to
  foreclose an appellate challenge: ‚If it turns out defense counsel
  is forced to use a peremptory strike to excuse someone who . . .
  should have been excused for cause, that’s a basis for an appeal.‛
  Defense counsel responded, ‚I understand that there’s a
  rationale for *the prosecutor’s striking Juror 1+.‛

  ¶31 Failure to pursue a Batson objection after opposing
  counsel has ‚offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
  explanation‛ waives the Batson challenge to the strike in

  (…continued)
  prosecutors to ‚offer any reason at all‛ for exercising a
  peremptory strike, ‚no matter how ‘silly or superstitious’—as
  long as it is race neutral.‛ Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited,

  97
  Iowa L. Rev. 1585

  , 1593 (2012) (quoting Purkett v. Elem,

  514 U.S.
  765

  , 768 (1995) (per curiam)).

  20120438-CA 13

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  question. Davis v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,

  160 F.3d 1023

  , 1027–
  28 (4th Cir. 1998); accord Hopson v. Fredricksen,

  961 F.2d 1374

  ,
  1376–77 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rudas,

  905 F.2d 38

  , 39 (2d
  Cir. 1990). That happened here. We therefore conclude that
  Flores waived his Batson challenge to the prosecution’s strike of
  Juror 1.

  B. The Three Remaining Strikes

  ¶32 After guiding the parties through the first two Batson
  stages, the trial court found that the State had ‚articulated *a+
  legitimate basis for the reasons for their strikes,‛ then denied
  Flores’s Batson challenge. The trial court implied the
  intermediary steps: that Flores failed to demonstrate a
  discriminatory motive and thus failed to carry his ‚ultimate
  burden of persuasion.‛ See Purkett v. Elem,

  514 U.S. 765

  , 768
  (1995) (per curiam). We ask only whether the trial court clearly
  erred by finding that Flores failed to demonstrate a
  discriminatory motive for any of the three remaining strikes.
  Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.

  1. Juror 2

  ¶33 The prosecutor struck Juror 2 as young and
  inexperienced. She explained that other jurors had ‚had more
  extensive involvement in family and career.‛ Juror 2, by
  comparison, seemed to be ‚someone who wouldn’t bring a lot of
  experience.‛ Flores argued during jury selection and again on
  appeal that Utah Code section 78B-1-103(2) prohibits excluding
  citizens from jury service on account of age. Flores also argues
  that ‚the prosecutor proffered no explanation why youth or
  inexperience in family or career were relevant to this case.‛

  ¶34 Both arguments fail. Utah Code section 78B-1-103
  prohibits excluding qualified citizens from jury service based on
  age. But it does not guarantee that a qualified panel member will
  survive voir dire, which subjects each potential juror to strikes
  for cause and peremptory strikes. And though Batson forbids
  parties from basing peremptory strikes on race or gender, it

  20120438-CA 14

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  offers potential jurors no protection from peremptory strikes
  based on age.

  ¶35 Further, despite defense protestations, the prosecutor was
  not obliged to explain ‚why youth or inexperience in family or
  career were relevant to this case.‛ Though Batson’s second step
  requires prosecutors to provide a ‚legitimate reason‛ for each
  challenged strike, ‚*w+hat *Batson+ means by a ‘legitimate reason’
  is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny
  equal protection.‛ Purkett,

  514 U.S. at 769

  . Even if we agreed that
  striking Juror 2 based on his age and experience ‚made no
  sense,‛ the prosecutor’s reason qualified as legitimate because it
  did not deny equal protection. The trial court considered Flores’s
  evidence of discrimination and the State’s proffered explanation,
  then found the State’s motives legitimate. That finding does not
  constitute clear error. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
  decision with respect to the prosecution’s strike of Juror 2.

  2. Juror 3

  ¶36 The prosecutor struck Juror 3 because ‚he was involved
  in a protective order hearing a couple of years ago‛ and a
  ‚domestic violence history‛ was not part of ‚the makeup‛ she
  sought in potential jurors. During jury selection, Flores argued
  that the prosecutor’s reason for striking Juror 3 was pretextual.
  On appeal, Flores argues that under State v. Jensen, peremptory
  strikes based on a potential juror’s past involvement with
  protective orders are gender-based and thus discriminatory. See

  2003 UT App 273

  ,

  76 P.3d 188

  .

  ¶37 During voir dire, the trial court asked the potential jurors
  if they had ‚ever been called to testify as a witness in a civil or
  criminal case.‛ Juror 3 raised his hand and stated that he had
  been called as a witness in a civil protective-order case several
  years before.

  ¶38 Though the mention of a protective order during voir dire
  superficially links the present case to Jensen, Jensen differs from
  this case in a critical way. In Jensen, the prosecutor struck three

  20120438-CA 15

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  men from the venire. Id. ¶ 2. During voir dire, each man had
  mentioned past involvement with protective-order cases. Id. The
  prosecutor referred to that involvement in explaining her
  decision to strike the men. Id. She continued, ‚*L+ogically I
  assumed that usually [men involved in protective-order cases]
  would be on defendant’s side,‛ because men were ‚more than
  likely‛ the respondents in protective-order cases. Id. The trial
  court found the prosecutor’s explanation gender-neutral and
  denied Jensen’s Batson challenge. Id. But this court reversed,
  concluding ‚as a matter of law that the prosecution did not
  provide a gender-neutral explanation for the two strikes in
  question.‛ Id. ¶ 15. We emphasized that the prosecutor’s
  explanation relied on a gender stereotype: men are more likely
  than women to be respondents in protective-order cases because,
  presumably, men are more prone to commit domestic violence.
  Id. ¶ 16. We concluded that ‚any use of gender in the jury
  selection process‛ violates the equal protection clause. Id. ¶¶ 16–
  17.

  ¶39 Though the prosecutor here explained that she sought to
  exclude jurors who had been ‚involved in a protective-order
  hearing,‛ she did not link involvement with protective-order
  cases to Juror 3’s gender. During voir dire, Juror 3 stated only
  that he had served as a witness in a protective-order case. Unlike
  the prosecutor in Jensen, the prosecutor here expressed no
  further assumptions about Juror 3’s role in the protective-order
  case based on his gender.

  ¶40 The relationship between a juror’s involvement in a
  protective-order hearing and the issues in this case remains
  unclear: as the prosecutor acknowledged, ‚domestic violence
  would not have been *at issue+ in this case.‛ But as we explained
  above, Batson’s second step does not require a reason that makes
  sense. It requires only ‚a reason that does not deny equal
  protection.‛ Purkett v. Elem,

  514 U.S. 765

  , 769 (1995) (per curiam).
  Unlike the prosecutor in Jensen, the prosecutor here did not link
  protective orders and gender. Her reason thus did not deny
  Juror 3 equal protection of the law. The trial court therefore did
  not clearly err by finding the State’s reasoning legitimate.

  20120438-CA 16

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to
  the prosecution’s strike of Juror 3.9

  3. Juror 4

  ¶41 The prosecutor struck Juror 4 because she felt ‚there was
  something unsettling for him about being‛ a juror in Flores’s
  case. She acknowledged that she did not know ‚if it was the
  particular subject matter‛ that appeared to trouble Juror 4 ‚or
  just being *in court+ as a juror altogether.‛ The prosecutor
  seemed to base her concerns on Juror 4’s expressions or
  demeanor: ‚I have been watching the faces of the jurors during
  jury selection and I don’t pretend to be able to accurately read
  faces but just the expression that I’ve seen on him, I was
  concerned about his level of—felt that he was somewhat offput
  by the case.‛ After Flores argued that her rationale ‚could be
  said in every single case with respect to every single juror,‛ the
  prosecutor countered, ‚This is jury selection. We have
  peremptories for a reason and sometimes I do get to just react on
  my gut level to a potential juror.‛

  ¶42 Flores may well be correct about the prosecutor’s
  explanation for striking Juror 4—the explanation could feasibly
  be used ‚in every single case with respect to every single juror.‛
  But that objection runs to Batson, not to the trial court’s ruling
  here. And despite the fears Flores expresses, we disagree that
  ‚there would never be a remedy under Batson‛ if a fungible

  9. Flores further argues that the prosecutor’s reason for striking
  Juror 3 was pretextual, as evidenced by the prosecutor’s failure
  to strike a female juror ‚with actual domestic violence
  experience.‛ But the trial court was in the best position to gauge
  whether the reason was pretextual, and the court found no
  pretext. We defer to that judgment unless the pretext is clear.
  State v. Higginbotham,

  917 P.2d 545

  , 548 (Utah 1996). That the
  prosecutor failed to strike a female juror who shared this one
  characteristic does not make the pretext clear.

  20120438-CA 17

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  subjective explanation allows the prosecutor to pass through
  Batson’s second stage.

  ¶43 In practice, a prosecutor’s vague explanation will in some
  cases overcome a Batson challenge. In other cases, it will not. The
  outcome depends on whether the evidence provided by the
  Batson challenger in stage one, weighed in context against the
  prosecutor’s explanation in stage two, convinces the trial court
  that the prosecutor’s strikes were based on purposeful
  discrimination. See Snyder v. Louisiana,

  552 U.S. 472

  , 485 (2008).
  Unless the prosecutor expressly acknowledges basing her strike
  on race or gender, no stage-two rationale necessarily dooms the
  prosecutor to stage-three defeat. As the United States Supreme
  Court explained in Miller-El v. Dretke, ‚peremptories are often
  the subjects of instinct, and it can sometimes be hard to say what
  the reason *for exercising a peremptory+ is.‛

  545 U.S. 231

  , 252
  (2005). If a prosecutor chooses to base a peremptory challenge on
  subjective factors, she will ‚stand or fall on the plausibility of the
  reasons‛ given.

  Id.

  ¶44 Because trial courts view ‚strikes made solely on ‘gut
  instinct’ or the demeanor of a juror . . . more suspiciously,‛ those
  courts are more likely to reject such a vague explanation for a
  strike. See State v. Rosa-Re,

  2008 UT App 472

  , ¶ 8 n.3,

  200 P.3d
  670

  . But the task of gauging the plausibility of a prosecutor’s
  explanation falls primarily on the trial court. Appellate courts
  may on occasion conclude as a matter of law that a prosecutor
  did not provide a gender-neutral explanation in the second
  Batson stage. See State v. Jensen,

  2003 UT App 273

  , ¶ 15,

  76 P.3d
  188

  . Or appellate courts may conclude that the proffered
  nondiscriminatory reasons for a strike ‚are so far at odds with
  the evidence that pretext is the fair conclusion.‛ See Dretke,

  545
  U.S. at 234

  . But because a Batson determination turns largely on
  the evaluation of credibility, we accord the trial court’s Batson
  findings ‚great deference.‛ Batson v. Kentucky,

  476 U.S. 79

  , 98
  n.21 (1986).

  ¶45 Here, though the prosecutor relied in part on her gut
  reaction to justify striking Juror 4, her rationale did not deny

  20120438-CA 18

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  Juror 4 equal protection and is not ‚so far at odds with the
  evidence that pretext is the fair conclusion.‛ See Dretke,

  545 U.S.
  at 234

  . We therefore defer to the trial court’s assessment of the
  prosecutor’s credibility and its conclusion that Flores failed to
  meet his ‚ultimate burden of persuasion regarding
  *discriminatory+ motivation.‛ See Purkett,

  514 U.S. at 768

  . We
  thus affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to the
  prosecution’s strike of Juror 4.

  III. Cumulative Error

  ¶46 Finally, Flores contends that the trial court’s alleged errors
  during jury selection undermine confidence in the verdict and
  thus constitute cumulative error. We will reverse under the
  cumulative-error doctrine only if the cumulative effect of several
  errors undermines our confidence that a fair trial was had. State
  v. Dunn,

  850 P.2d 1201

  , 1229 (Utah 1993). But the cumulative-
  error doctrine cannot be applied here. Flores ‚has failed to show
  that any of the trial court’s actions amount to error,‛ much less
  that the cumulative effect of any errors should undermine our
  confidence in the verdict. See State v. Killpack,

  2008 UT 49

  , ¶ 56,

  191 P.3d 17

  .

  CONCLUSION

  ¶47 The trial court’s decision to limit Flores’s religious-
  affiliation voir dire questioning does not constitute an abuse of
  discretion. And the trial court did not clearly err in denying the
  Batson challenge. We therefore affirm.

  ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

  ¶48 After issuance of our opinion in this case, Flores filed a
  petition for rehearing raising two issues. We deny the petition
  for rehearing for reasons explained below.

  20120438-CA 19

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  ¶49 First, the Petition for Rehearing asserts that our opinion
  impermissibly relies on ‚semantics.‛ We do not believe it does.
  We can only review the trial court’s refusal to ask the question
  Flores requested. And although the trial court invited Flores to
  ‚be more detailed about the specific question,‛ Flores repeated
  that he wanted the trial court to ask prospective jurors’
  ‚religious affiliation.‛ The trial court declined to ask the
  question, perhaps because the question seemed to approach the
  prohibition contained in article I, section 4 of our constitution, or
  perhaps because defense counsel himself stated that a Utah
  statute ‚does prohibit strikes based on religious affiliation.‛ See
  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (‚A qualified
  citizen may not be excluded from jury service on account
  of . . . religion . . . .‛).

  ¶50 In any event, the trial court explored Flores’s expressed
  concern—one shared by the prosecution—that jurors might give
  more or less weight to the testimony of LDS clergy members:

  Also, there will be, it’s anticipated that there
  are going to be members of religious organizations
  or clergy, religious leaders who are testifying at
  this trial. I previously have given you an
  instruction that you should judge the credibility of
  witnesses of law enforcement the same way that
  you would weigh the testimony of any other
  witnesses regardless of their job or position in the
  community. The same question applies with
  respect to clergy or other religious leaders. Do you
  need—you need to judge the credibility of a clergy
  member or religious leader the same way that you
  would judge any other witness regardless that
  person’s position in the community. The question
  is, do any of you feel that you would be unable to
  follow that direction as it relates to religious
  leaders or clergy and not be able to sit as a fair and
  impartial juror in this case? If so, please raise your
  hand.

  20120438-CA 20

  2015 UT App 88

  State v. Flores

  We do not agree that the trial court’s inquiry amounted to
  nothing more than the ‚stark little exercise‛ condemned in State
  v. Saunders,

  1999 UT 59

  , ¶ 34,

  992 P.2d 951

  .10 Flores contends that
  in not asking prospective jurors their religious affiliation the trial
  court abused its discretion. ‚An abuse of discretion occurs if the
  . . . court’s actions are inherently unfair or if we conclude that no
  reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the . . .
  court.‛ State v. Arguelles,

  2003 UT 1

  , ¶ 101,

  63 P.3d 731

  (alteration
  in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
  Under this standard, and on the record before us, we cannot
  agree that the trial court abused its discretion.

  ¶51 The Petition for Rehearing also takes issue with our
  statement that ‚mounting a successful Batson challenge on
  appeal verges on the impossible.‛ Supra ¶ 28. Flores does not
  contend that the opinion misstates the principles to be applied in
  a Batson case in Utah, nor does it. Nor does our characterization
  suggest that appellate Batson challenges never succeed.
  Obviously, they sometimes do. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke,

  545
  U.S. 231

  , 266 (2005); State v. Valdez,

  2004 UT App 214

  , ¶ 30,

  95
  P.3d 291

  , rev’d on other grounds,

  2006 UT 39

  ,

  140 P.3d 1219

  .
  Finally, to the extent Flores seeks to distinguish Utah law from
  federal law on this question, we see no basis for the distinction
  here. Flores’s appeal alleges a Batson violation, not a violation of
  the Utah Constitution separate from Batson, J.E.B., and their
  progeny. No state constitutional claim was before us on this
  appeal. See State v. Worwood,

  2007 UT 47

  , ¶ 19,

  164 P.3d 397

  .

  ¶52 The petition for rehearing is accordingly denied.

  ____________

  10. ‚Although the lead opinion in State v. Saunders,

  1999 UT 59

  ,

  992 P.2d 951

  , is a plurality opinion, a reading of all the justices’
  opinions in that case reveals that we cite herein only to portions
  of the lead opinion that enjoyed majority support.‛ Depew v.
  Sullivan,

  2003 UT App 152

  , ¶ 11 n.3,

  71 P.3d 601

  .

  20120438-CA 21

  2015 UT App 88

• 2. Former church leader charged with rape after allegedly assaulting teen in 2002

  • 4 Mar 2025
  • News article
  • ABC4 Utah

  • original
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  • back to list

  SALT LAKE COUNTY, Utah (ABC4) — A former church leader was charged with multiple counts of rape in Salt Lake County for allegedly assaulting a 14-year-old in his congregation more than 20 years ago, according to recently unsealed documents.

  Armando Flores, 69, was charged with two counts of rape and one count of object rape after allegedly sexually assaulting a teenager several times while serving as her religious leader in 2002. Court documents say he was serving as a branch president for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints at the time.

  Salt Lake County District Attorney Sim Gill announced the charges Tuesday, saying the victim-survivor was 14 years old when the alleged assaults took place. The charges, which were originally filed on Feb. 20, 2025, and were unsealed last Wednesday, Feb. 26.

  In 2002, the victim’s family had recently joined the religion, and Flores was their local church leader. The abuse took place on three separate days, according to Gill. He said on one of the days, Flores grabbed the victim “in a bear hug” as she walked to her youth seminary class and told her to get in his truck.

  Flores then drove to a local park where he allegedly sexually assaulted her before dropping her off at school.

  According to court documents, after the first rape incident, the victim confronted Flores and said she was going to tell her mother when he reminded her of “everything he had done for her family and that they needed him,” and the victim decided not to tell her.

  When authorities spoke with Flores, he allegedly said he remembered the victim’s family and assisted them in several ways, including helping them receive monetary assistance from the church and finding a job.

  He also allegedly admitted to having a conversation with the victim “about the fact that she was no longer a virgin,” documents say.

  “The youth in our community should be able to trust the adults in their lives. We are here to help them flourish as they grow into adulthood, not hurt them and take advantage of their trust. We appreciate the courage the victim-survivor had to come forward. We will provide her with all the support this office can offer,” Gill said.

  He continued to encourage anyone who is a victim of crime — or knows someone who is — to report it so it can be investigated.

  “Once it is investigated it can be prosecuted, and the offender can be held accountable. You don’t have to suffer in silence,” Gill said.

  ABC4 has reached out to the church for comment and has not yet received a response.

• 3. Former LDS branch president charged with alleged raped of teenager

  • 4 Mar 2025
  • News article
  • FOX13 [Salt Lake City]

  • original
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  SALT LAKE CITY — A former branch president with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has been charged with the rape of a teenager.

  Salt Lake County Attorney General Sim Gill announced multiple charges against Armando Flores on Tuesday, for sexual assaults that allegedly began in 2002 when the victim was 14 years old.

  In 2012, Flores was convicted of sexual battery involving a 17-year-old who belonged to his church.

  According to charging documents, Flores was the branch president of the church which the victim and her family had joined after moving to Utah.

  Flores is accused of discussing sexual acts with the victim as he taught her to drive, and another time served her wine when she was at his home. After one night where the victim found herself naked in Flores's bed, the victim said she confronted him about what had occurred, to which Flores allegedly "reminded [the victim] of everything he had done for her family and that they needed him," leading the girl not to tell her family.

  The documents show that Flores allegedly continued to sexually assault the girl, even telling her about a doctor "who could sew her up and make her a virgin again."

  Flores admitted that the victim wrote him a letter thanking him for all he had done for her family as branch president of the church, but also confronted him about assaulting her.

  Flores was charged with two counts of first-degree felony rape and one county of first-degree object rape.

  “The youth in our community should be able to trust the adults in their lives," said Gill. "We are here to help them flourish as they grow into adulthood, not hurt them and take advantage of their trust. We appreciate the courage the victim-survivor had to come forward."